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This	 article	 explores	 the	 relationship	 between	 obligation	 and	 publicly	 funded	
healthcare.	Taking	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	as	the	focal	point	of	discussion,	
the	 article	 presents	 a	 historical	 analysis	 of	 the	 shifting	 nature	 and	 function	 of	
obligation	as	 it	 relates	 to	 this	 institution.	Specifically,	and	drawing	 inspiration	 from	
recent	 literature	 that	 takes	 seriously	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 tie	 or	 bond	 at	 the	 core	 of	
obligation,	 the	 article	 explores	 how	 the	 forms	 of	 social	 relation	 and	 bonds	
underpinning	a	system	like	the	NHS	have	shifted	across	time.	This	is	undertaken	via	




factors	 –	 including	 privatisation,	 marketisation,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 debt	 and	 finance	
capital	–	are	having	on	previously	settled	understandings	of	obligation	and	the	forms	
of	social	relation	underpinning	them	associated	with	the	NHS.	It	is	therefore	argued	
that	 an	 adequate	 analysis	 of	 obligation	 in	 healthcare	 law	 and	 related	 fields	 must	
extend	 beyond	 the	 doctor-patient	 relationship	 and	 that	 of	 state-citizen	 of	 the	
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Arguably,	 rights	 –	 especially	 the	 elucidation,	 enumeration	 and	 pursuit	 of	 patients’	
rights	–	have	defined	 the	 raison	d’être	of	medical	 law,	healthcare	 law,	and	 related	
fields,	such	as	bioethics.	Set	against	a	critique	of	the	alleged	overweening	power	of	
medics	and	healthcare	professionals,	 the	objective	of	much	writing	 in	 those	 fields,	
together	 with	 litigation	 initiated	 by	 patients	 themselves,	 has	 been	 to	 empower	
patients	 via	 the	 discourse	 of	 rights. 1 	The	 right	 to	 receive	 adequate	 treatment	

















for	one’s	private	and	family	 life;6	the	right	 to	be	 free	 from	 inhuman	and	degrading	
treatment;7	–	these	are	just	some	of	the	rights	that	have	been	advanced	in	the	cause	
of	 empowering	 patients	 and	 individuals	 vis-à-vis	 the	 medical	 and	 healthcare	
professions.	 If	rights	have	received	copious	attention	 in	the	 literature,	what	can	be	
said	 of	 obligation?8	No	doubt	 as	 a	 result,	 at	 least	 partly,	 of	 this	 focus	 on	 patients’	
rights	 and	 their	 desired	 implementation	 in	 practice,	 discussion	 of	 obligation	 in	


































the	 field	 of	 public	 health	 and	 public	 health	 law,12	and	 in	 the	 context	 of	 medical	
research.13	Traditionally,	 though,	 it	 has	 been	 around	 doctors	 and	 other	 healthcare	




sphere.	 Thus,	 the	 discussion	 of	 obligation	 occurs	 against	 a	 broader	 canvas	 than	 is	
usually	encountered	in	the	existing	literature.	Specifically,	the	theme	of	obligation	is	
explored	in	the	context	of	the	changing	nature	of	publicly	funded	healthcare	systems,	
with	 the	 UK’s	 National	 Health	 Service	 (NHS)	 functioning	 as	 the	 focal	 point	 of	
discussion.14	The	article	therefore	presents	a	historical	analysis	of	the	shifting	nature	
and	function	of	obligation	as	it	relates	to	this	institution.	It	does	so	by	way	of	three	




was	 the	mode	 of	 funding	 he	 selected	 for	 the	NHS	 related	 to	 those	 principles	 and	


















section.	 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 article	 discusses	 some	 contemporary	 literature	 and	
policy	 developments	 and	 examples	 directly	 relevant	 to	 the	 NHS	 and/or	 publicly	
funded	healthcare	systems	generally.	In	doing	so,	the	purpose	is	both	to	identify	and	
chart	 some	 current	 forms	 of	 obligation,	 and	 to	 explore	 how	 these	 relate	 to,	 and	
mark	a	shift	from,	Bevan’s	writings.	Thus,	the	second	section	presents	an	analysis	of	
the	 relationship	between	the	 individual,	obligation	and	publicly	 funded	healthcare.	
The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 section	 considers	 some	 literature	 on	patient	 obligation	 (itself	
much	 less	written	about	 in	 the	 fields	of	medical	 law,	healthcare	 law,	and	bioethics	
than	the	obligations	of	doctors	and	healthcare	professionals)	and	argues	that	what	
emerges	 from	 this	 is	 an	 idea	 of	 self-obligation	 –	 duties,	 for	 example,	 to	 work	 on	
one’s	own	health	–	that	seeks	to	ground	a	broader	notion	of	a	civic	sense	of	patient	
obligation.	The	analysis	then	turns	to	consider	the	effects	of	marketisation	on	how	
patient	 (and	 more	 generally,	 individual)	 obligation	 might	 be	 understood	 in	 the	
context	of	today’s	NHS	health	and	social	care	policy.	Finally,	the	article	explores	the	
growing	 importance	 of	 contract	 as	 a	 means	 of	 governing	 various	 contemporary	
developments	within	 the	NHS.	Through	a	discussion	of	 some	examples	–	 including	
the	Private	 Finance	 Initiative	–	 the	objective	here	 is	 to	 reflect	on	what	 the	 role	of	
contract	can	reveal	about	the	changing	forms	and	applicability	of	obligation	in	an	era	
when	 the	 roles,	 inter	 alia,	 of	 finance	 capital,	 debt,	 and	 privatisation	 are	 steadily	






In	undertaking	 the	 foregoing	analysis,	 the	article	 takes	seriously	 the	key	 feature	of	
obligation	 to	 be	 found	 at	 the	heart	 of	 its	 etymology	 –	 namely	 the	bond	or	 tie.	 As	
Alain	Supiot	and	others	have	noted,	ob-ligare	literally	means	to	tie	to	or	bind.15	Thus,	
Supiot	argues	that	 things	that	bind	me	to	others	–	such	as	words	or	 texts	–	create	
obligations.	 And	 Scott	 Veitch	 has	 explored	 how,	 inter	 alia,	 ‘this	 sense	 of	 tying	 or	
binding	is	a	central	component	of	understanding	social	and	professional	obligations,	
and	 indeed	 social	 and	 professional	 life’. 16 	When	 considering	 obligation	 in	 the	
healthcare	context,	this	article	is	therefore	not	only	interested	in	identifying	types	of	
substantive	 obligation,	 but	 also	 in	 exploring	 what	 these	 reveal	 about	 the	 shifting	
character	of	 the	 ties	and	bonds	 that	underpin	a	publicly	 funded	healthcare	system	
like	the	NHS.	More	specifically,	 it	 is	the	types	of	social	relation	that	the	obligations	










Thus,	 rather	 than	conceptualising	obligation	 in	 the	sense	of	a	correlative	duty	of	a	
right,	 it	 is	 its	 understanding	 as	 ‘the	 whole	 relationship’	 –	 the	 bonds	 of	 the	












bonds,	 and	 the	 relations	 they	 signify,	 have	 altered	 over	 time.	 Relatedly,	 it	 also	
enables	 a	 focus	both	on	how	 the	 form	of	 existing	 relations	 –	 between	 citizen	 and	
state,	for	example	–	alters	over	time	and	how	new	forms	of	relation	–	for	instance,	
between	 creditor	 and	 debtor	 –	 emerge	 and	 become	 prominent.	 It	 is	 one	 of	 the	
contentions	of	 this	 article,	 therefore,	 that,	 in	 seeking	 to	 comprehend	obligation	 in	
the	 field	of	 healthcare,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	move	beyond	a	 concern	merely	with	 the	
doctor-patient	relationship	to	consider	other	forms	of	relation	and	actors,	including	
private	healthcare	providers	and	financial	 institutions.	Moreover,	and	as	the	article	
seeks	 to	demonstrate,	while	 relevant	 to	understanding	how	obligation	 is	 currently	
conceptualised	 in	 this	area,	an	adequate	grasp	of	 this	 idea	as	 it	 relates	 to	the	NHS	
demands	 moving	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 ‘ethical’	 frame	 of	 analysis	 that	 tends	 to	





obligation	 is	 not	 confined	 to	 the	 doctor-patient	 relationship,	 but	 extends	 to	 other	
actors,	 including	 states	 and	 public	 bodies.	 Public	 health	 and	 public	 health	 law	 are	
two	 areas	 of	 scholarship	 that	 have	 engaged	 with	 health	 related	 matters	 at	 this	
broader	level.	While	literature	in	those	fields	shares	some	themes	–	for	example,	the	









In	 light	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 market	 to	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows,	 and	 the	
aforementioned	 utility	 of	 a	 historical	 dimension	 to	 this,	 a	 useful	 context	 for	 the	
discussion	is	provided	by	Aneurin	Bevan’s	reflections	in	the	early	1950s	on	the	then	
recently	 established	 UK	 National	 Health	 Service.19	Bevan,	 the	 Labour	 Minister	 of	
Health	 commonly	 credited	with	having	 founded	 the	NHS,	 framed	 the	need	 for	 the	
creation	 of	 the	 NHS	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 an	 existing,	 predominantly	 market-
based	 healthcare	 system,	 in	 which	 access	 to	 healthcare	 was	 only	 possible	 if	 one	
could	either	pay	for	it	privately,	was	fortunate	enough	to	be	covered	by	insurance,	or	
was	aided	by	what	Bevan	called	‘private	charity	and	endowment’.	It	was	this	lack	of	




























For	 Bevan,	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 NHS	 was	 the	 idea	 that	
healthcare	should	not	be	viewed	as	a	commodity	–	that	 is,	as	something	produced	
for	 sale	 on	 a	 market.	 Thus,	 healthcare	 is	 to	 be	 available	 ‘without	 charge’;	 the	
healthcare	 system	 is	 to	 eradicate	 the	 feeling	of	 ‘financial	 anxiety’	when	 ill;	 and	 its	







What,	 then,	 might	 Bevan’s	 discussion	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 medicine	 and	
healthcare	 pre-	 and	 post-NHS	 reveal	 about	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 obligation	 and	
bonding	in	those	eras?	Prior	to	the	NHS,	the	transaction	between	patient	and	doctor	










whereby	 parties	 are	 taken,	 formally	 at	 least,	 to	 meet	 as	 equals,	 created	 legal	
obligations	 –	 the	 patient	 had	 to	 pay	 the	 required	 fee	 and,	 assuming	 she	 did,	 the	
doctor	was	 required	 to	provide	 the	 relevant	medical	 service.	Moreover,	 implicit	 in	
Bevan’s	 critique	 of	 commercialism	 in	 the	 field	 of	 healthcare	 is	 a	 vision	 of	 social	
relations	in	which	‘the	nexus	[or	bond]	of	man	to	man’	is	‘cash	payment’.24	Contract	
as	 the	 predominant	 source	 of	 legal	 obligations	 in	 medicine	 and	 healthcare	 is	
removed	with	 the	establishment	of	 the	NHS,	 and	 the	 legal	 obligation	 to	provide	a	
health	 service	 free	 at	 the	 point	 of	 need	 becomes	 a	 unitary	 one	 assumed	 by	 the	
State.25	This	much	is	clear	from	section	1	of	the	various	incarnations	of	the	National	
Health	 Service	 Act	 since	 the	 NHS’s	 commencement.	 The	 first	 Act	 of	 1946,	 for	
example,	reads	as	follows:	
	
1.-(1)	 It	 shall	 be	 the	 duty	 of	 the	 Minister	 of	 Health	 …	 to	 promote	 the	 establishment	 in	
England	 and	Wales	of	 a	 comprehensive	health	 service	designed	 to	 secure	 improvement	 in	
the	 physical	 and	 mental	 health	 of	 the	 people	 of	 England	 and	Wales	 and	 the	 prevention,	























the	 State	 assume	 the	 legal	 obligation	 to	 finance,	 and	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	
Health	to	become	accountable	for,	healthcare	services	within	the	UK.	In	this	scenario,	
it	is	no	longer	contract	that	is	the	binding	device,	creating	obligations,	but	a	certain	
form	 of	 principle	 –	 namely,	 that	 no	 citizen	 should	 be	 deprived	 of	 access	 to	
healthcare	 services	 owing	 to	 lack	 of	 funds.	 This	 principle	 of	 universal	 access	
irrespective	of	means	posits	a	form	of	solidarity	(that	‘communal	responsibility’)	that	





why	 he	 opted	 for	 this,	 as	 opposed	 to	 other,	methods	 of	 finance.	 For	 instance,	 he	
dismisses	the	option	of	group	insurance	because:	
	
All	 the	 insurance	company	does	 is	 to	assess	 the	degree	of	 risk	 in	any	particular	 field,	work	
out	the	premium	required	from	a	given	number	of	individuals	to	cover	it,	add	administrative	







adds	nothing	but	 its	own	profits.	 This	profit	 is	 therefore	wholly	 gratuitous	because	 it	does	
not	derive	from	the	creation	of	anything.26 
	








state	 taxes,	 rather	 than	 through	other	means,	 such	 as	 borrowing.27	As	well	 as	 this	
mode	 of	 financing	 the	 NHS	 involving	 an	 element	 of	 redistribution	 in	 the	 form	 of	
providing	 a	 healthcare	 service	 for	 all	 citizens	 irrespective	 of	means,	 it	 can	 also	 be	
considered	 to	 reflect	 principles	 similar	 to	 those	 underpinning	 the	 old	 Roman	 Law	









than	simply	a	particular	 source	of	 revenue	 for	healthcare.	 It	 is	also	bound	up	with	
the	socio-political	meaning	of	taxation.	Leroy,	for	instance,	argues	that	the	modern	
welfare	 state	 is	 synonymous	 with	 a	 ‘“socio-financial	 democratic	 contract”	 which	
establishes	a	link	“between	mass	taxation	and	social	rights”’.30	In	other	words,	there	
is	an	understanding	that	the	legal	obligation	to	pay	taxes	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	
provision	 by	 the	 state	 of	 various	 forms	 of	 social	 protection.	 Leroy	 also	 describes	


















for	 a	 socio-political	 concept	 of	 taxation,	 according	 to	which	 taxes	 are	 a	 legitimate	
contribution	to	the	financing	of	regulatory	and	redistributive	welfare	policies,	which	
may	enjoy	wide	support	even	among	taxpayers	who	do	not	immediately	benefit’.31	It	
is	 suggested	 that	 this	 latter	 legitimation	 is	 the	 one	underpinning	Bevan’s	 vision	 of	





Bevan’s	 vision	 for	 the	NHS	 is	 therefore	of	 a	healthcare	 system	 in	which	obligation	
entails	 communal	 responsibility	of,	 and	 for,	 each	and	all.	 This	 type	of	obligation	 is	

















in	 turn,	 grounds	 the	 civic	 obligation	 of	 patients;	 the	 second,	 by	 reference	 to	
contemporary	 health	 and	 social	 care	 policy,	 concerns	 links	 between	 individual	
obligation	and	the	market.	There	are	various	possible	reasons	for	the	emergence	of	
interest	 in	 individual	obligation	 in	the	area	of	publicly	funded	healthcare.	While,	as	
will	be	seen	in	the	following	subsection,	these	include	concerns	about	the	possibility	
of	untrammelled	patient	power	 flowing	 from	a	particular	conception	of	autonomy,	
they	 are	 also	 to	 be	 located	 in	 broader	 shifts	 in	 political	 fashion,	 especially	 the	
(enduring)	popularity	of	“third	way”	thinking	that	stresses	the	importance	of	citizens’	
obligations	 and	 not	merely	 their	 rights.	 This	 political	 philosophy	 not	 only	 enables	
analysis	of	the	different	ways	in	which	obligation	attaches	to	individuals	in	this	area;	












question	 the	 seemingly	 unidirectional	 manner	 in	 which	 patient	 autonomy	 is	
understood	within	medical	ethics	–	namely,	 that	autonomy	 is	equivalent	merely	to	
participation	in	the	making	of	medical	decisions,	rather	than	to	an	acceptance	of	the	
consequences	 that	 flow	 from	 patients’	 decisions.33	They	 also	 analyse	 how	 patient	
obligations	flow	from	what	they	call	‘general	ethics’	–	‘from	responsibilities	to	others	




only	with	 the	 ethical	 obligations	 of	 doctors,	 and	 not	 of	 patients.	 Arguing	 that	 the	
only	real	obligation	on	patients	is	to	consent	to	treatment,	they	comment:	‘Little	or	
nothing	 is	 said	about	what	kinds	of	decisions	patients	ought	 to	make.	Nor	 is	much	
said	about	their	responsibilities	for	making	good	rather	than	bad	decisions’.35	Their	
argument	is	that	autonomy	ought	to	mean	the	same	in	medical	ethics	as	it	does	in	
‘general	 ethics’;	 that	 is,	 that	 autonomy	 is	 inextricably	 bound	 up	 with	 taking	





















to	 turn	 up	 for	 a	 scheduled	 GP	 appointment.	 However,	 it	 also	 encompasses	 an	
obligation	 to	oneself	 to	promote	his	or	her	own	health	and	not	 to	damage	 it	–	an	




‘a	 civic	 obligation	 to	 follow	 preventive	 health	 measures	 recommended	 by	 one’s	
doctor’.39	–	 to	 stop	 smoking	 or	 eating	 fatty	 foods,	 for	 instance.	 Those	 types	 of	
obligation	 involve	obligations	 to	 the	health	 care	 system	and	 to	other	patients	 and	
take	the	form	of	‘duties	not	to	use	health	services	casually’.40	
	
Draper	 and	 Sorell	 note	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 obligation	 to	 oneself	 can	 be	 found	 in	
Kant’s	moral	philosophy	and	his	notion	of	the	noumenal	self,	where	only	this	form	of	
self	 is	 compatible	with	 autonomy	–	 the	 goal	 of	morality	 –	 as	 it	 demands	 that	 one	
does	not	 slavishly	 submit	 to	one’s	base	desires	–	eating	or	drinking	excessively,	 to	











healthcare	 context,	 not	 to	 make	 unlimited	 demands	 on	 a	 service	 with	 limited	













choice	 regarding	 one’s	 healthcare	 should	 be	 fully	 respected,42	rather	 than	 being	
confined,	as	it	traditionally	was,	to	the	question	of	consent	and	the	need	to	protect	
bodily	integrity.	Obligation,	in	this	context,	is	firmly	placed	on	the	health	service	and	













discussed	above,	 she	highlights	 the	 importance	of	patients	accepting	 responsibility	




Draper	 and	 Sorell’s	 argument	 concerns	 what	 is	 here	 called	 the	 ethical	 sense	 of	
patient	obligation.43	What	are	some	of	its	key	features?	First,	 it	takes	the	form	of	a	




Secondly,	 this	 sense	 of	 patient	 obligation	 has	 an	 other-regarding	 dimension	 that	
points,	 implicitly,	 to	 what	 was	 identified	 in	 the	 Introduction	 as	 a	 central	
characteristic	of	obligation	–	namely,	the	idea	of	a	bond	or	bonding.	This	can	be	seen,	
for	 instance,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 claims	 that	 patients	 be	 empowered	 to	 participate	
jointly	 with	 doctors	 in	 treatment	 decisions.	 For	 Draper	 and	 Sorell,	 this	 ought	 to	
translate	 into	a	 joint	responsibility	for	the	outcomes	of	such	participatory	decision-
making,	rather	than	patients	being	discharged	of	their	responsibility	for	the	negative	
















linked.	 This	 is	 especially	 so	 as	 regards	 Draper	 and	 Sorell’s	 civic	 obligations	 which,	
insofar	as	 they	pertain	 to	patients,	ultimately	 involve	obligations	 to	 the	healthcare	
system	and	other	patients	who	make	use	of	it.	Patients’	obligations	to	reduce	their	
demands	on	 a	healthcare	 system	with	 finite	 resources	by,	 for	 instance,	 promoting	
their	 own	 health	 and	 following	 preventive	 healthcare	 advice	 from	 doctors,	 are	
meant	to	ensure	a	measure	of	 justice	prevails	 in	a	healthcare	system	like	the	NHS.	
Placing	inordinate	demands	on	such	a	system	potentially	compromises	its	universal	
nature	and	 its	 founding	principle	of	access	based	on	need.	There	 is	a	 strong	sense	
here,	though,	in	which	the	other-regarding	dimension	of	those	civic	obligations	–	the	
bonds	with	 others	 –	 is	 structured	 by	 obligations	 to	 one’s	 self	 to	 act	 or	 behave	 in	
particular	ways	 (the	 normative	 element).	 This	 is	 because	 the	 authors’	 argument	 –	
outlined	above	–	involves	treating	the	obligation	to	one’s	self	to	promote	one’s	own	
health	as	the	primary	obligation	that	grounds,	ultimately,	patients’	duties	as	citizens	














thus	 rendering	 you	more	 deserving	 of	 treatment.	 In	 terms	 of	 bonding,	 then,	 it	 is	
suggested	here	that	this	idea	of	the	civic	obligation	of	patients	can	be	characterised	
as	being	grounded	 in	a	 form	of	 self-binding:	one	 is	bound	here	 to	 reflect	on	one’s	
lifestyle	 insofar	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 one’s	 health;	 to	 adopt	measures	 that	 protect	 and	
promote	health	and	prevent	 illness;	 in	short,	 to	 live	healthily	and	behave	better	 in	
this	respect,	whatever	that	‘better’	may	mean.	Insofar	as	the	ethical	sense	of	patient	
obligation	 is	 concerned,	 failure	 to	 act	 in	 such	 ways	 is	 perceived	 as	 an	 individual	
failing	 –	 implicit	 in	 Draper	 and	 Sorrel’s	 reference	 to	 patients	 being	 capable	 of	
negligent	 decision-making	 –	 that	 may	 jeopardise	 one’s	 access	 to	 state	 funded	
healthcare.	As	Zygmunt	Bauman	puts	it:	‘If	[individuals]	fall	ill,	it	is	assumed	that	this	
has	 happened	 because	 they	were	 not	 resolute	 or	 industrious	 enough	 in	 following	
their	health	regime’.45	
	










stressed	 the	 importance	of	balancing	a	number	of	 ‘conflicting	goals’	–	 ‘[Beveridge]	




of	 healthcare	 –	 ‘positive	 and	 preventive	 as	 well	 as	 curative	 measures’	 –	 was	
premised	 on	 a	 combination	 of	 State	and	 personal	 responsibility:	 ‘Restoration	 of	 a	
sick	person	to	health	 is	a	duty	of	 the	State	and	the	sick	person,	prior	 to	any	other	
consideration’.49	He	 speaks	 of	 the	 individual	 needing	 to	 ‘recognise	 the	 duty	 to	 be	
well	 and	 to	 co-operate	 in	all	 steps	which	may	 lead	 to	diagnosis	of	disease	 in	early	
stages	when	it	can	be	prevented’.50	While,	as	Timmins	notes,	it	is	important	to	stress	
the	economic	rationale	behind	Beveridge’s	vision	of	a	new	health	service	–	namely,	


















bits	 of	 Conservatism’. 52 	State	 protection	 was	 always	 accompanied	 by	 talk	 of	
incentivisation,	 individuals	 needing	 to	 help	 themselves,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	
curtailing	 abuse	 of	 the	 new	 social	 security	 system.	 As	 Aneurin	 Bevan	 noted	 some	
years	later	in	his	reflections	on	the	creation	of	this	institution,	this	concern	about	the	
potential	for	‘abuse’	by	citizens	in	the	context	of	a	new	healthcare	system	based	on	
the	 principle	 of	 free	 access	 at	 the	 point	 of	 need,	 formed	 an	 important	 reason	




As	 with	 the	 contemporary	 literature	 on	 patients’	 obligations	 discussed	 above,	
Beveridge	envisaged	the	duties	of	the	state	and	individuals	in	respect	of	healthcare	
as	ethical	obligations;	and	 insofar	as	 the	 latter	were	concerned,	 those	duties	were	
designed	 to	 foster	 self-sufficient	 individuals	 who	 needed	 to	 deploy	 their	 own	
resources	to	ensure	a	healthy	existence.	By	undertaking	this	form	of	self-obligation	–	
comprising	work	on	the	health	of	the	self	–	citizens	would	simultaneously	discharge	



















The	 literature	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 subsection	 is	 essentially	 concerned	 with	
what	 is	here	 called	 the	ethical	dimension	of	obligation	–	 that	 is,	with	what	ethical	
duties	patients	should	have,	the	types	of	action	they	should	undertake	to	discharge	
these,	 and	 the	 need	 to	 hold	 patients	 accountable	 should	 they	 fail	 to	 act	 in	 the	
stipulated	 ways.	 Arguably,	 what	 is	 missing	 in	 this	 analysis	 is	 any	 clear	 link	 to	 the	
themes	and	issues	–	the	role	of	commercialism,	healthcare	as	a	commodity,	and	the	
importance	 of	 taxation,	 for	 instance	 –	 that	 played	 such	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 shaping	
Bevan’s	 thinking	 regarding	 the	character	of	 the	NHS.	This	matters	as	 it	 is	precisely	
those	 types	 of	 theme	 and	 issue	 that	 are	 reasserting	 themselves	 with	 such	 force	
within	 today’s	NHS.	Consequently,	 in	order	 to	present	a	more	 rounded	analysis	of	
patient	obligation,	 it	 is	suggested	that	attention	also	needs	to	be	paid	to	what	can	

















themselves,	 and	 act,	 as	 consumers	 of	 healthcare. 56 	For	 instance,	 they	 have	 a	
responsibility	to	give	feedback	on	their	treatment	and	experiences	of	the	healthcare	
system,57 	and	 a	 legal	 right	 to	 make	 choices	 about	 their	 healthcare	 treatment,	
including	 where	 it	 should	 take	 place. 58 	Thus,	 while	 there	 is,	 for	 example,	 no	
compulsion	to	make	particular	kinds	of	choice	in	this	regard,	there	is	no	escape	from	
thinking	of	oneself,	and	acting	as,	a	consumer	–	 that	 is,	 from	making	some	sort	of	
choice.59	Obligation	 here	 concerns	 this	 broader	 compulsion	 of	 patients	 to	 act	 and	
think	like	consumers	in	the	context	of	healthcare.	
	
This	 idea	 of	 patients	 increasingly	 being	 obliged	 to	 act	 and	 think	 of	 themselves	 as	
consumers	 points	 to	 a	 different	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
obligation	and	choice	to	that	identified	earlier	in	existing	work	on	patient	obligation.	
In	 Draper	 and	 Sorell’s,	 and	 Brazier’s,	 analyses	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 autonomy,	 this	
relationship	is	understood	in	the	sense	of	an	obligation	to	accept	the	consequences	
of	one’s	choices.	From	this	standpoint,	choices	are	not	meant	to	be	unreflective	or	
equated	 with	 the	 mere	 satisfaction	 of	 preferences.	 Rather,	 they	 demand	 such	
qualities	as	self-control,	abstemiousness,	and	a	consideration	of	the	effects	of	one’s	
decisions	on	others.	 In	contrast,	 the	making	of	choices	that	 lies	at	the	heart	of	the	














propriety	 of	 those	 choices.	 It	 is	 not	 so	much	 an	 ethical	 obligation	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
patients	accepting	responsibility	for	their	choices	that	affect	their	health;	rather,	the	
making	of	choices	that	defines	the	patient-as-consumer	concerns	the	satisfaction	of	
preferences,	 as	 patients	 effectively	 make	 choices,	 furnished	 with	 relevant	
information	 and	 statistics	 regarding	 levels	 of	 performance,	 based	 on	 where	 they	
would	prefer	to	have	medical	treatment.	The	choices	associated	with	the	patient-as-
consumer,	then,	do	not	assume	an	other-regarding	nature	in	the	sense,	for	instance,	
of	 considering	 the	 consequences	 of	 my	 behaviour	 (to	 live	 unhealthily;	 place	
inordinate	demands	on	 the	health	 service	etc)	 for	other	patients	–	especially	 their	
access	 to	publicly	 funded	health	care.	Rather,	 the	obligation	of	patients	 to	act	and	
think	like	consumers	is	bound	up	with	the	marketisation	of	such	a	healthcare	system	
as	 it	 demands	 that	 patients	 choose	 from	 a	 range	 of	 options.	 Again,	 this	
understanding	of	choice	differs	from	that	to	be	found	in	Brazier’s	work,	for	example,	
as	it	is	not	about	a	right	to	have	one’s	choices	about	one’s	healthcare	–	the	particular	




nobody	 will	 necessarily	 hold	 you	 responsible	 for	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 you	 select	
between	 different	 providers	 or	 treatments	 because	 these	 are	 choices	 driven	 by	














This	 shift	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 marketisation	 and	 the	 choice	 agenda	 can	 be	
illustrated	by	reference	to	an	example	–	the	system	of	payments	to	those	in	need	of	
care	known	as	 ‘direct	payments’.	These	are	sums	of	money	provided	to	 individuals	
by	 public	 institutions,	 which	 individuals	 use	 to	 purchase	 care	 services	 for	
themselves.62	The	aim	is	to	give	individuals	more	flexibility	in	how	their	services	are	
provided.	The	relevant	website	says:	 ‘If	you	need	care	and	support,	 this	had	 in	the	
past	been	provided	direct	from	your	local	council.	Direct	payments	were	introduced	
to	 give	 people	 more	 choice	 and	 control	 over	 how	 their	 care	 and	 support	 was	
arranged,	 to	 help	 them	 live	 more	 independently’. 63 	Certain	 obligations	 can	
accompany	the	choice	to	receive	direct	payments,	including,	firstly,	the	requirement	






















secondly,	 the	 assumption	 of	 the	 legal	 role	 of	 an	 employer	 if	 you	 are	 using	 the	
payment	 to	 pay	 for	 a	 care	 worker,	together	 with	 undertaking	all	 the	 legal	
responsibilities	that	go	with	this.	Help,	the	website	says,	may	be	available	from	local	
organisations	 to	 manage	 the	 administration	 involved	 and	 other	 responsibilities	 of	
being	an	employer.	
	
What	 can	 direct	 payments	 and	 the	 obligations	 accompanying	 them	 reveal	 about	
obligation	as	it	is	being	discussed	in	this	article?	First,	although	not	mentioned	on	the	
website,	the	most	obvious	obligation	inherent	in	the	direct	payment	is	the	obligation	
to	 spend	 it.	 As	 noted,	 rather	 than	 providing	 the	 service	 itself,	 the	 state	 provides	
money	 which,	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 service,	 the	 individual	 must	 spend.	 This	
necessarily	involves	making	a	choice	as	to	which	provider	will	provide	your	care.	This	
obligation	 to	 act	 as	 a	 consumer	 of	 care	 services	 is	 therefore	 bound	 up	 with	 the	
creation	 and	maintenance	 of	 a	market	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 publicly	 funded	 health	
and	social	care	for	it	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	promotion	of	competition	amongst	
health	and	social	care	providers.	Spending	one’s	direct	payment	necessarily	fosters	
this	 form	of	 competition	and	points	 to	 the	commodification	of	 this	 type	of	 care	 in	
that	it	can	now	be	understood	as	being	produced	for	sale	on	a	market.	Second,	the	











consumption	 rather	 than	 the	 simple	 use	 of	 a	 public	 service.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
direct	payments	involve	a	clear	shift	in	the	assumption	and	discharge	of	obligations	
from	 the	 state	 to	 the	 individual.	Discretion	 as	 to	 how	 to	 allocate	 the	 resources	 of	
publicly	funded	health	and	social	care	(spending	the	direct	payment	in	this	case)	and	
the	 associated	management	 that	 comes	with	 this	 allocation	 (keeping	 records	 etc.)	





demand	 accountability	 in	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	money	 is	 spent,	 but,	 to	 create	
new	relationships	and	forms	of	obligation	–	between	employer	and	employee,	say	–	
that	were	previously	alien	to	the	manner	in	which	citizens	obtained	publicly	funded	

















The	 forms	 of	 obligation	 described	 and	 discussed	 in	 this	 subsection	 can	 all	 be	
considered	to	be	 linked	to	the	 increasing	prevalence	of	 the	market	within	the	NHS	
and	 social	 care.	 Individual	 obligation	 appears	 here	 in	 a	 different	 guise	 to	 that	
encountered	 in	 the	 current	 literature	 on	 patient	 obligation.	 Thus,	 it	 does	 not	 so	
much	 take	 the	 form	 of	 moral	 injunctions	 as	 modes	 of	 action	 required	 for	 the	
realisation	of	economic	ends.	Thus,	 the	obligation	 to	choose	concerns	 the	drive	 to	
force	patients	to	think	of	themselves	as	consumers	and,	 in	doing	so,	of	the	NHS	as	
just	 another	 site	 in	 which	 market	 relations	 operate.	 And	 the	 obligation	 to	 spend	
public	 funds	by	purchasing	 social	 care	enables	 the	creation	of	new	markets	 in	 this	
type	 of	 care,	 while	 simultaneously	 fostering	 new	 forms	 of	 legal	 relationship	
(between	 employer	 and	 employee,	 for	 instance)	 and	 obligation	 within	 the	 health	






Bevan	 saw	 the	manifestation	of	 the	 collective	dimension	of	 the	NHS	 in	 the	 state’s	
assumption	 of	 the	 obligation	 to	 provide	 access	 to	 healthcare	 based	 on	 need	 and	
funded	via	general	taxation,	it	is	argued	the	realisation	of	this	collective	aspect	in	the	
literature	discussed	above	is	grounded	in	the	primacy	of	individual	obligation	in	the	




behaviours	 and	 lifestyles	 –	 the	 suggestion	 being	 that	 failure	 to	 take	 individual	
responsibility	 for	 one’s	 health	 may	 result	 in	 state	 healthcare	 services	 becoming	
inaccessible,	despite	clinical	need.	As	such,	 it	has	resonances	of	 the	 ‘something	for	
nothing’	argument	that,	as	noted	earlier,	Bevan	was	quick	to	dismiss	as	a	potential	
danger	 of	 the	 new	 NHS.	 Obligation,	 here,	 equates	 primarily	 to	 a	 process	 of	 self-
binding	 –	 of	 being	 bound	 to	work	 on	 the	 self	 such	 that	 one’s	 actions	 conform	 to	
unspecified	levels	of	moral	conduct.	As	the	direct	payments	example	illustrates,	this	
self-binding	also	 involves	a	process	of	 transforming	how	we	think	about	ourselves;	
thus,	 rather	 than	 as	 individuals	 in	 need	 of	 care	 services,	 we	 need	 to	 perceive	
ourselves	as	consumers	(obliged	to	choose	from	the	various	providers	competing	on	
the	 market	 for	 social	 care	 that	 such	 payments	 inevitably	 help	 to	 construct);	 as	
enterprises	managing	our	own	social	services,	those	who	provide	them,	and	all	the	






Citizenship	 is	no	 longer	defined	as	active	participation	 in	 the	definition	of	a	 common	good	
specific	 to	a	political	community,	but	as	a	permanent	mobilization	of	 individuals	who	must	











Arguably,	 this	 transformation	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 citizenship	 charts	 the	 shift	 from	
Bevan’s	 vision	 of	 the	 NHS	 as	 a	 common	 good	 available	 for	 all	 and	 based	 on	 the	
principle	of	solidarity	to	the	consumer-oriented	NHS	of	today	in	which	citizenship,	as	
the	 examples	 discussed	 above	 demonstrate,	 equates	 to	 the	 obligation	 to	 enter	
agreements	 to	 provide	 public	 goods	 that	 satisfy	 individuals.	 This	 leads	 us	








much	 access	 to	 medical	 and	 healthcare	 services	 was	 facilitated.	 What	 is	 notable	
today,	 however,	 is	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 this	 legal	 institution	 as	 an	 important	
mechanism	through	which	various	aspects	of	the	NHS	are	managed.	By	way	of	some	
examples	 relating	mainly	 to	 the	growing	 importance	of	private	 finance	and	private	
providers	 of	 healthcare	within	 the	NHS,	 this	 section’s	 purpose	 is	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	
broader	functions	contract	can	be	understood	to	be	performing	in	this	context	today,	
what	 implications	 these	 have	 for	 notions	 of	 obligation	 and	 the	 form	 of	 social	











via	 the	PFI	 contract,	own	and	manage	 the	hospital.	Clinical	Commissioning	Groups	





ranging	 from	 25-40	 years,	 although	 once	 they	 are	 paid	 off,	 the	 NHS	 does	 not	
necessarily	end	up	owning	the	premises.	The	PFI	as	a	form	of	funding	public	projects	
such	 as	 the	 building	 of	 hospitals	 has	 been	 controversial,	 not	 least	 as	 the	 levels	 of	
repayment	from	the	NHS	budget	required	to	service	the	debt	and	accruing	interest	
produce	high	deficits	and	result	in	less	money	for	NHS	Trusts	to	spend	on	healthcare	
for	 patients.	 A	 few	 figures	 are	 useful	 here.	 Between	2010	 and	2015,	 the	NHS	 and	









building	 work,	 construction	 companies,	 and	 companies	 maintaining	 the	 hospitals	
and	 providing	 services.	 8%	 of	 the	money	 paid	 to	 the	 PFI	 companies	 in	 the	 past	 6	
years	has	been	 in	 the	 form	of	pre-tax	profit	 and,	 thus,	 cannot	be	used	 for	patient	
care.	 Finally,	 £480m	 of	 dividends	 was	 paid	 out	 on	 these	 contracts,	 representing	




One	 way	 into	 this	 question	 is	 to	 conceive	 of	 the	 PFI	 scheme	 as	 illustrative	 of	
Streeck’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 tax	 state	 to	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 debt	 state.	
Unlike	 the	 tax	 state,	 in	 which,	 as	 noted	 earlier,	 governments	 raise	 the	 revenues	
needed	 to	 fund,	 say,	adequate	public	 services	 through	sufficient	 levels	of	 taxation,	
the	 debt	 state	 is	 characterised	 by	 low	 tax	 receipts,	 with	 the	 shortfall	 in	 revenue	
necessary	for	government	expenditure	having	to	be	made	up	through	borrowing	in	
the	form	of	debt.68	While	this	is	clearly	the	case	regarding	the	source	of	revenue	for	
PFI	projects,	 it	 is	 also	 crucial	 to	note	 that	 the	 tax	 state	 continues	 to	play	a	 central	
role	 here	 (albeit	 one	 having	 a	 different	 function	 to	 that	 described	 by	 Streeck	 –	
namely,	 the	 funding	 of	 adequate	 public	 services).	 This	 is	 because	 the	 revenue	











to	 build	 NHS	 hospitals,	 together	 with	 the	 ongoing	 interest	 payments	 on	 what	 is	
effectively	a	loan,	are	financed	through	the	tax	revenues	that	continue	to	form	the	
funding	 base	 of	 the	 annual	 NHS	 budget.	 A	 number	 of	 observations	 can	 be	made	
regarding	 this.	 First,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 update	 partially	 Bevan’s	 equation	 of	 the	
selection	of	general	taxation	as	the	funding	base	for	the	NHS	with	the	removal	of	the	
profit	 motive	 in	 healthcare.	 For,	 while	 revenue	 raised	 from	 taxation	 continues	 to	
fund	the	delivery	of	healthcare,	 it	also	increasingly	acts	as	a	source	of	revenue	and	
profit	 for	 the	private	sector	–	here	 in	 the	 form,	 inter	alia,	of	 interest	payments	on	
debt.69	One	way	of	 thinking	about	 this	 revenue	stream	 is	as	a	 form	of	 rent	paid	 to	
creditors	over	many	years	–	a	gratuitous	form	of	revenue,	to	use	Bevan’s	description	




understood	 in	the	context	of	 the	NHS.	 It	was	argued	earlier	 that	Bevan’s	vision	for	
the	NHS	could	be	thought	to	embody	the	‘all	for	one	and	one	for	all’	principle	to	be	
found	 in	 the	 Roman	 Law	 notion	 of	 obligatio	 in	 solidum.	 If,	 rather	 than	 referring	
simply	to	either	the	creditor’s	right	to	something	or	the	debtor’s	correlative	duty	in	
relation	 to	 that	 right,	 the	obligatio	 ‘more	properly	 denotes	 the	whole	 relationship	













citizen	 should	be	deprived	of	 access	 to	healthcare	 services	owing	 to	 lack	of	 funds.	
The	PFI	scenario	presents	a	more	complicated	picture	of	obligation.	On	the	one	hand,	
there	 is	 what	 can	 be	 called	 a	 communal	 responsibility	 of	 taxpayers	 for	 the	
repayment	of	debt	and	interest	associated	with	PFI	projects.	In	this	sense,	it	can	be	
seen	 to	 be	 truer	 to	 the	 original	 substance	 of	 the	 obligatio	 in	 solidum,	 which	
concerned	joint	liability	for	financial	debt.70	Moreover,	the	ideas	in	this	Roman	Law	
conception	 that	 liability,	 rather	 than	 blood	 or	 love,	 is	 the	 bonding	 force,	 and,	 as	
Pensky	notes:	‘We	are	bound	together	with	those	with	whom,	like	it	or	not,	our	own	
fates	 and	 our	 own	 well-being	 are	 interwoven’,71	can	 be	 thought	 to	 be	 directly	
relevant	to	the	PFI	scenario	too.	On	the	other	hand,	the	nature	of	the	bond	differs.	
Thus,	 if	Bevan’s	choice	of	taxation	as	the	financial	source	of	the	NHS	was	meant	to	
signify	 the	 solidary	 bonds	 amongst	 taxpayers	 (who	might	 be	 thought	 to	 represent	
the	 debtors	 and	 creditors	 of	 the	 obligatio	 in	 solidum),	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	
liability	 ‘for	the	reversals	of	fortune	of	another’	within	the	group72	–	you	pay	when	
you	 are	 well	 and	 benefit	 when	 you	 become	 ill	 –	 insofar	 as	 the	 PFI	 is	 concerned,	
taxpayers	 are	 bound	 not	 to	 one	 another	 in	 a	 collective	 relationship	 defined	 by	
















character	 Bevan	 ascribed	 to	 it,	 assuming	 instead	 a	 commercial	 dimension	 (the	
‘private	 acquisitiveness’	 of	which	 Bevan	 spoke),	 in	 that	 it	 functions	 as	 a	 source	 of	
ongoing	rent	and	profit	for	finance.	
	
Moreover,	 obligation	 here	 can	 be	 characterised	 as	 disciplinary	 and	 opaque.	 It	 is	
disciplinary	in	that	taxpayers	are	effectively	legally	obliged	over	a	period	of	decades	
to	 use	 part	 of	 the	 taxation	 that	 comprises	 the	 national	 budget	 for	 healthcare	 to	
repay	debt	and	the	high	interest	payments	associated	with	this.75	It	is	opaque	in	that	
this	type	of	obligation	is	rarely	publicised,76	certainly	in	comparison	with	the	forms	of	













treatment.	 Its	 opacity	 also	 contrasts	 with	 the	 typical	 debate	 over	 NHS	 resources,	
which,	 though	 crucial	 in	 itself,	 often	 assumes	 a	 quantitative	 character,	 revolving	
around	 the	 extra	 resources	 needed	 by	 the	 institution	 rather	 than	 identifying	 the	
causes	of	 that	need,	which,	 as	 the	PFI	 indicates,	would	necessarily	 encompass	 the	
non-healthcare	 related	 directions	 in	 which	 the	 NHS	 budget	 can	 flow.	 This	 is	






This	 also	 has	 potential	 implications	 for	 the	 form	 of	 legitimation	 underpinning	 the	
fiscal	 contract,	 which	 was	 discussed	 earlier.	 There,	 by	 reference	 to	 Leroy’s	 three	
forms	 of	 tax,	 it	 was	 suggested	 that	 his	 notion	 of	 “contribution”	 tax,	 in	 which	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 taxation	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 redistributive	 welfare	 policies	 that	 may	
garner	the	support	of	those	who	may	not	be	immediate	beneficiaries,	underpinned	
Bevan’s	 vision	 of	 the	 NHS.	 While	 this	 no	 doubt	 continues	 to	 be	 relevant	 to	 the	
contemporary	NHS,	 it	would	 not	 capture	 the	 function	 of	 taxation	 vis-à-vis	 the	 PFI	
described	 above,	 which,	 as	 noted,	 is	 used	 to	 manage	 interest,	 as	 well	 as	 capital,	
repayments.	Nor	would	Leroy’s	“exchange	tax”	seem	to	capture	the	legitimacy	of	the	
fiscal	 contract	 here.	 For,	 while	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that,	 in	 exchange	 for	 their	 tax	
payments,	 taxpayers	 obtain	 new	 hospitals	 in	 which	 to	 receive	 healthcare,	 it	 is	





leaves	 Leroy’s	 final	 form	 –	 the	 “obligation	 tax”	 –	 which	 may	 well	 be	 the	 most	








contract.	This	 is	 important	for	two	reasons.	First,	 it	signals	the	re-emergence	today	
of	the	importance	of	contract	as	a	legal	mechanism	for	the	regulation	of	healthcare	
and	 the	 implementation	of	 healthcare	 policy.78	As	 discussed	 earlier,	 Bevan’s	 vision	
for	 the	 NHS	 was	 to	 move	 away	 from	 a	 commoditised	 form	 of	 healthcare	
characterised	 by	 the	 doctor-patient	 relationship	 governed	 by	 contract.	 But,	 as	 in	
other	 areas	 of	welfare,79	contract	 has	 reappeared	within	 contemporary	 healthcare	
as	 one	 of	 the	 regulatory	 tools	 of	 choice.	 This	 matters	 because,	 at	 least	 as	 the	
example	of	the	PFI	demonstrates,	contract	again	reappears	simultaneously	with	the	
reintroduction	of	 the	 importance	of	 the	money	 relation	within	healthcare.	And,	as	
with	 the	contracts	characteristic	of	pre-NHS	healthcare,	 it	 is	 the	cash	nexus	 that	 is	












of	 today’s	 PFI	 contracts.	 Secondly,	 the	 disciplinary	 character	 of	 the	 PFI,	 outlined	
above,	 exemplifies	 what	 some	 have	 argued	 is	 a	 transformation	 in	 the	 function	 of	
contract	in	recent	years.	Alain	Supiot,	for	instance,	has	noted	a	shift	from	the	original	
understanding	of	contract	as	involving	obligations	created	by	parties	who	have	freely	




(if	 you	must	enter	 into	 contracts):	 ‘the	user	 is	 transformed	 into	a	party	obliged	 to	




This	 regulatory	 function	of	 contract	 can	be	witnessed	 in	 the	 field	of	 contemporary	
healthcare.	 It	 is	evident	 in	the	example	discussed	above	–	namely,	the	PFI	scheme.	
For,	despite	the	contracting	party	being	the	state,	rather	than	taxpayers	per	se,	given	
the	 source	of	 funding	 to	 repay	 the	 capital	 and	 interest	of	PFI	 arrangements	 in	 the	
healthcare	 sector	 is	 general	 taxation	 and	 that	 such	 payments	 can	 have	 negative	
impacts	 on	 citizens’	 access	 to	 healthcare	 services	 (as	 less	money	means	 cutbacks,	
closure	of	hospital	departments	or,	in	the	worst	case,	whole	hospitals),	PFI	contracts	
can	be	considered	to	discipline	taxpayers	by	imposing	obligations	on	them	regardless	







of	 State	 for	 Health	 to	 impose	 a	 new	 contract	 upon	 them	 in	 his	 pursuit	 of	 the	
implementation	 of	 a	 Conservative	 party	 manifesto	 commitment	 to	 introduce	 a	
seven-day	 NHS.81	The	 doctors	 argued	 there	 had	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 meaningful	 prior	
consultation	 or	 negotiation	 over	 the	 contract’s	 proposed	 terms	 and	 conditions,	
including	 weekend	 working	 –	 something,	 they	 argued,	 would	 disproportionately	




here	was	 deployed	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 disciplining	members	 of	 the	medical	 profession	 –	
obliging	 them	 to	work	 at	 certain	 unsociable	 times	 of	 the	week	 in	 order	 to	 satisfy	
what	was	characterised	as	an	overwhelming	public	demand.	Moreover,	common	to	
the	 deployment	 of	 contract	 in	 the	 doctors’	 and	 taxpayers’	 scenarios	 is	 not	 only	 a	
sense	of	the	parties	having	no	say	over	the	particular	contract’s	terms	and	conditions,	
but	 over	 the	 wider	 forces	 lying	 behind	 those	 particular	 contracts	 too.	 Writing	 of	
contemporary	 debt	 relations	 and	 obligation,	 Scott	 Veitch	 argues	 that	 not	 only	 do	
citizens	find	themselves	bound	into	practices	of	 indebtedness	 in	various	spheres	of	
life,	they	are	also	‘not	in	a	position	to	bargain	about	the	ground	rules’	–	namely	the	
laws	of	 the	market.82	Framing	his	analysis	 in	Viscount	Stair’s	notion	of	 ‘obediential	







experiential’,	 and,	 thus,	 do	 not	 derive	 their	 binding	 force	 from	 ‘positive	 laws,	 [or]	
from	 human	 agreements’	 –	 Veitch	 argues	 that	 non-negotiability	 extends	 to	 the	
broader	economic	forces	from	which	these	particular	types	of	obligation	emanate.83	
As	Maurizio	Lazzarato,	 in	his	discussion	of	 the	debtor-creditor	 relationship	–	which	
he	 takes	 to	be	 the	key	 relationship	of	our	age	–	somewhat	grandly	puts	 it:	 ‘[Debt]	
intensifies	mechanisms	of	exploitation	and	domination	at	every	level	of	society’	and	
encompasses	 all	 agents	 and	 classes:	 ‘Everyone	 is	 a	 “debtor,”	 accountable	 to	 and	
guilty	 before	 capital.	 Capital	 has	 become	 the	 Great	 Creditor,	 the	 Universal	
Creditor.’84	Similarly,	 via	 PFI	 contracts,	 citizens	 become	 bound	 into	 circles	 of	 debt	
arising	 from	 the	 needs	 and	 requirements	 of	 finance	 capital,	 and,	 via	 new	
employment	 contracts,	 doctors	 into	 labour	 practices	 driven	 by	 the	 purported	
demands	of	a	fast-paced	24-7	society	and	the	exigencies	of	flexible	labour	markets.	
Contract	 therefore	 becomes	 equated	 with	 non-negotiability	 and	 discipline,	 rather	
than	with	the	negotiated	construction	of	freely	assumed	reciprocal	obligations	that	
Supiot	identifies	as	the	defining	characteristic	of	the	traditional	idea	of	contract.85	To	














obligations	 or	 because	 those	 that	 exist	 within	 the	 contract	 are	 not	 enforced.	 The	
following	 are	 some	 examples	 of	 this	 relating	 to	 the	 role	 of	marketisation	 and	 the	
private	sector	in	the	NHS.	First,	and	sticking	with	the	PFI,	some	have	argued	that	an	
asymmetry	of	obligation	can	be	detected	regarding	 the	 risks	assumed	by	 the	state	
and	finance	in	PFI	contracts,	with	finance	being	protected	from	a	variety	of	economic	
risks.	 As	 Pollock	 et	 al	 note,	 these	 contracts	 rarely	 transfer	 economic	 risks	 to	 the	
funding	consortium,	with	the	result	that	these	usually	fall	on	the	state	and	taxpayers.	
For	instance:	‘Where	a	Trust	wishes	to	terminate	a	contract,	either	because	of	poor	
performance	 or	 insolvency	 of	 the	 private	 consortium,	 it	 still	 has	 to	 pay	 the	
consortium’s	financing	costs,	even	though	the	latter	is	in	default’.86	
	
A	 similar	 scenario	 can	 be	 witnessed	 insofar	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 NHS	 services	 by	
private	companies	is	concerned.	Contracts	for	the	outsourcing	of	the	delivery	of	NHS	
healthcare	 to	 private	 companies	 are	 now	 common,	 something	 aided	 by	 the	
obligation	placed	upon	clinical	commissioning	groups	(CCGs)	to	establish	a	tendering	




the	 contracts	 have	 been	 constructed,	 providers	 have	 been	 able	 to	withdraw	 from	







leaving	 a	 gap	 in	 service	 provision	 and	 the	NHS	 to	 undertake	 the	 costly	 process	 of	





feature	 concerns	 the	weak	 capacity	 and	 reluctance	 of	 CCGs	 to	 enforce	 the	 terms,	
and	hence	the	obligations	within,	contracts	between	CCGs	and	private	providers.	In	
its	 2015	 survey	 of	 181	 CCGs,	 the	 Centre	 for	 Health	 and	 the	 Public	 Interest	 (CHPI)	
found	that	only	7	out	of	15,000	contracts	between	CCGs	and	private	companies	had	
been	 terminated	 for	poor	performance;	only	134	 contract	query	notices	had	been	
issued;	 and	 just	 16	 CCGs	 had	 imposed	 any	 financial	 sanction	 on	 private	 providers	
owing	 to	 poor	 performance. 89 	The	 reasons	 for	 this	 weak	 monitoring	 and	
enforcement	are	many,	but	include	a	lack	of	capacity	on	the	part	of	CCGs	to	monitor	
and	 enforce	 contracts;	 ‘asymmetry	 of	 information’	 such	 that	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 for	
CCGs	 ‘to	 know	 whether	 a	 provider	 is	 delivering	 according	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	
contract,	or	is	cutting	corners	or	reducing	quality	in	order	to	gain	extra	revenue’.90;	
and	 a	 fear	 of	 compounding	 the	 already	 difficult	 financial	 positions	 of	 private	













Some	of	 these	 factors	 are	 apparent	 in	 an	 example	 cited	 by	 the	 CHPI	 –	 Castlebeck	




to	place	patients	at	 the	hospital.	While	 clearly	an	 instance	of	 regulatory	 failure	on	
the	 part	 of	 the	 NHS,	 the	 underlying	 reason	 for	 Castlebeck’s	 non-performance	 of	
obligations	under	the	contract	could	be	traced	to	the	need	to	discharge	another	kind	
of	obligation	discussed	earlier	in	this	article	–	namely,	the	obligation	to	pay	interest	
on	 debt.	 A	 private	 equity	 firm	 had	 purchased	 Castlebeck	 and	 the	 debt	 that	 the	
company	was	carrying	attracted	an	annual	interest	payment	of	£38m.	As	the	surplus	
from	running	the	hospital	was	used	to	pay	this,	the	company’s	management	needed	









otherwise,	 to	 enforce	 stipulated	 contractual	 obligations	 that	 renders	 one	 of	 the	





attempting	 to	 understand	 the	 dynamics	 at	 play	 here.	 First,	 and	 as	 the	 Castlebeck	
example	perhaps	most	clearly	illustrates,	one	source	of	the	effective	absence	of	duty	
can	be	obligations	of	a	different	sort	emanating	from	elsewhere	–	in	that	case,	from	
the	 financial	 model	 upon	 which	 private	 equity	 operates	 (one	 demand	 being	 the	
obligation	 to	 maintain	 debt	 interest	 payments).	 This	 points	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 a	
hierarchy	of	obligation,	 in	which	obligations	to	finance	take	precedence	over	those	
of	 adequate	 care.	 In	 terms	 of	 bonding,	 it	 denotes	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	
strengthening	 and	 maintenance	 of	 one	 type	 of	 bond	 (the	 tie	 to	 finance	 capital)	
necessitates	 the	 loosening	of	other	 forms	 (for	 instance,	 that	between	professional	
carer	and	patient,	where	failure	to	discharge	professional	duties	of	care	to	patients	
may	 attract	 no	 sanction).	 But	 it	 also	 signals	 an	 incipient	 transformation	 in	 the	
foundational	 obligations	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 NHS.	 Thus,	 whereas	 these	 have	
traditionally	concerned	the	obligation	to	provide	access	to	healthcare	based	on	need	
and	not	ability	to	pay	characteristic	of	a	publicly	funded	universal	healthcare	system,	
the	 examples	 described	 above	 suggest	 that	 this	 obligation,	 while	 still	 present,	 is	
slowly	 ceding	 ground	 to	 the	 types	 of	 obligation	 owed	 to	 finance	 capital	 and	 the	
emerging	 importance	 of	 (a	 new	 sense	 of)	 the	 ability	 to	 pay	 –	 not	 for	 medical	
treatment	this	time,	but	in	order	to	maintain	payments	of	debt	and	interest.	And	it	is	
contract	through	which	this	shifting	dynamic	 is	mediated.	As	such,	and	 in	 line	with	
Supiot’s	characterisation	of	its	contemporary	function,	contract	can	be	considered	as	
being	 bound	 up	 here	with	 the	 legitimation	 of	 power	 –	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 power	 of	
finance.	 In	Streeck’s	terminology,	 it	signals	the	rising	importance	within	the	NHS	of	





very	 important	 insofar	 as	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 state	 to	 maintain	 debt	 and	 interest	
repayments	 is	 concerned.	 As	 the	 foregoing	 examples	 testify,	 whether	 private	
consortia	supplying	finance	as	part	of	PFI	schemes	or	private	healthcare	providers,	it	
is	the	confidence	of	market	players	that	the	state	is	increasingly	careful	to	sustain,91	
something	 that	 results	 in	 the	 prioritising	 of	 obligations	 to	 finance	 over	 those	
associated	with	the	healthcare	of	patients.	Unlike	the	Staatsvolk,	whose	ties	to	the	
state	are	of	an	ongoing,	public	character	and	express	‘a	duty	of	loyalty’	‘in	return	for	
the	 state’s	 role	 in	 safeguarding	 their	 livelihood’	 (although,	 as	 the	 discussion	
regarding	the	legitimacy	of	taxation	above	suggests,	this	may	be	questioned	today),	
the	people	of	the	market	are	bound	to	the	state	‘purely	by	[ephemeral]	contractual	





concerns	 the	 role	of	 the	 state.	 It	 is	 tempting	 to	 think	 that,	 like	 citizens,	 states	 are	
subject	to	economic	forces	and	laws	that	they	are	incapable	of	shaping	or	changing.	
The	 foregoing	discussion	would	 certainly	 seem	 to	point	 in	 this	direction.	Decisions	
not	 to	 impose	 contractual	 obligations	 on	 private	 providers	 or	 follow	 up	 on	 the	







simply	 to	obey	 such	 forces;	 in	other	words,	owing	 to	 forces	beyond	one’s	 control,	
there	was	really	no	choice	but	to	let	those	private	providers	off	the	hook.	But	from	
where	 do	 those	 economic	 forces	 and	 laws,	 and	 the	 obligations	 (such	 as	 those	
associated	 with	 debt)	 accompanying	 them,	 emanate?	 The	 danger	 here	 lies	 in	
forgetting	that	the	state	is	integral	in	constructing	and	maintaining	the	economy	and	
that	it	is	the	source	of	the	laws	that	are	foundational	in	establishing	markets.	Despite	
appearing	 as	 such,	 the	 type	 of	 economic	 settlement	 and	 accompanying	 state	 and	
citizen	 obligations	 in	 any	 era	 are	 not	 inevitable,	 but	 the	 outcomes	 of	 deliberate	
policies.	 Thus,	 the	 debt	 and	 interest	 repayments	 associated	 with	 the	 PFI	 and	 the	
skewed	obligations	of	contracts	between	the	state	and	private	health	care	providers,	
are	symptoms	of	political	choices	made	decades	ago,	rather	than	what	appear	to	be	




Streeck	 says	 of	 the	 debt	 state:	 ‘[I]t	 subjects	 itself	and	 its	 activity	 to	 the	 control	 of	
creditors	 in	 the	shape	of	 ‘markets’’.92;	and	decisions	 to	create	what	 is	effectively	a	
market	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 publicly	 funded	 healthcare	 by	 instituting	 a	 tendering	
process	for	the	delivery	of	NHS	healthcare	and	using	competition	law	to	ensure	this	
is	 strictly	enforced.93	On	 the	other	hand,	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	developments	and	
obligations	 traced	 in	 this	 section	 might	 be	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 result	 of	 so-called	








Paradoxically,	 it	 is	 states	 that	have	 initiated	 the	economic	measures	 (of	deregulation)	 that	















This	 suggests	 not	 only	 the	 central	 role	 of	 deliberate	 policy	 making	 but	 also	 of	
political	 struggle	 and	 contestation.	 This	 is	 important	 to	 remember,	 especially	 at	 a	










calls	 doxa	 (‘the	 contrary	 is	 unthinkable…this	 is	 how	 things	 are’95)	 –	 were,	 when	
considered	historically,	‘often	the	product	of	a	struggle’.	As	he	says,	while	writing	of	
the	state:	‘There	is	nothing	that	is	constitutive	of	the	state	as	it	is	taken	for	granted	
today	 that	 was	 not	 obtained	 without	 drama;	 everything	 was	 conquered.	 The	




and	 not	 open	 to	 question.	 Over	 the	 last	 40	 years	 or	 so,	 the	 sorts	 of	 principles	
characteristic	of	healthcare	delivery	prior	to	the	NHS	–	marketisation,	the	centrality	
of	the	cash	nexus,	and	healthcare	as	a	mainly	private	good	–	have	reappeared	within	
the	NHS	 itself.	 One	 view	 of	 this	would	 be	 that	 the	 depth	 of	 penetration	 of	 those	
principles	has	resulted	in	a	new	doxa	–	one	in	which	marketisation,	privatisation,	and	
individualisation	are	now	taken	for	granted	and	rendered	unquestionable.	However,	
despite	 the	 developments	 discussed	 in	 this	 article,	 the	 NHS	 has	 not	 entirely	
succumbed	to	the	march	of	neoliberal	policies.	It	continues	to	assert	the	principle	of	
access	 to	 healthcare	 free	 at	 the	 point	 of	 need	 and	 to	 implement	 this	 in	 practice,	
insofar	 as	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 do	 so;	 and	 its	 professionals	 continue	 to	 characterise	
themselves	 as	 public	 servants	 devoted	 to	 their	 patients.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	
current	 era	 of	 the	 NHS	 is	 one	 in	 which	 the	 struggle	 over	 its	 future	 direction	 and	
nature	continues	to	be	a	live	and	pressing	issue.	By	excavating	some	of	the	heritage	







founding,	 one	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article	 has	 been	 to	 recall	 and	 highlight	 the	
types	of	collective	bond	envisaged	at	its	origins.	This	is	not	only	to	enable	an	analysis	
of	 how	 those	 bonds	 differ	 from	 those	 that	 have	 emerged	 in	 recent	 decades	 –	
including	the	self-binding	of	individual	obligation	and	the	increasingly	important	ties	
to	finance	–	but	to	hold	them	up	against	those	new	notions,	and,	in	so	doing,	stress	
the	 importance	of	protecting	 them	from	becoming,	 in	Bourdieu’s	words,	 ‘defeated	
lateral	possibilities’	dismissed	to	the	realm	of	the	unconscious.	
	
